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THE LAUNCH-COST BOTTLENECK
R. A. Lynch
Convair Division of General Dynamics
San Diego, California

Summary
"Space operations are very costly." This simple
state mentis widely accepted as true and is the major
deterrent to the full utilization of space. This dis
cussion concentrates on the major contributor to
space operations cost: the launch system.
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It will be shown, initially, how high current space
operations costs are. The launch vehicle is a major
element in the overall system operations cost. Ex
tremely high launch costs are the major deterrent to
increased space traffic. However, if space traffic is
not maintained or increased, our entire space utiliza
tion potential may disappear. Low-cost launch sys
tems are needed now to ensure growth. We may be at
a turning point.
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Next, several low-cost launch-system concepts are
discussed, including the low-cost expendable, 1-1/2
stage or drop tank concept and the Triamese reusable
launch vehicle/spacecraft concept.
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Progress toward a reusable launch system has al
ways been hampered by the "anti-low-cost launch-sys
tem feedback loop. " Each element of this loop is ex
amined to indicate that we may currently have the
ability to break this loop and move forward.
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This discussion is not based on a rigorous technical
analysis, although it contains some technical elements.
The ability to break the launch-cost bottleneck and pro
ceed with space utilization is based on many nontech
nical, political, psychological factors. Some of these
more intangible factors are included in this discussion.
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Current Launch Systems
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Figure 1 presents some current launch vehicles with
their operational cost per flight and a dollars per pound
of delivered payload measure of efficiency. Two-way
transportation of payload is even more expensive be
cause launch vehicle payload must be invested in an
entry vehicle. These costs seem high, but when com
pared with other complex transportation systems they
seem unexplainably high.
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Figure 1. Current Launch Systems
Figure 2 presents a picture of a Boeing 707 and a
space logistic system using a Saturn IB launch vehicle
and a semiballistic return capsule. The systems are
comparable in size and complexity. The passenger
safety requirements are of similar importance. If the
systems are compared on an equal energy basis (foot
pounds), the 707 would have to fly a round trip between
Los Angeles and Saigon to expend energy equal to an
orbital flight (~ 1012 foot-pounds). A passenger on the
707 would pay~$940 while a passenger in the space
logistic system would pay~ $800, 000 (assuming he was

There have been many analogies made between
modern commercial jet transports and space transporta
tion systems. ^ These analogies serve two main pur
poses. First, they tend to describe the space transporta
tion problem in terms that all persons familiar with
modern air travel might understand. Second, they
supply a convenient target for the host of people that
disagree with the manner in which they are done.
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tion can be considered as 16, 500 pounds per flight. If
total program cost, including development, is used as
a basis, the payload delivery cost is $4, 050 per pound;
(if development is excluded, this cost becomes $3, 780
per pound). Comparing this cost with the costs of
Figure 1 shows logistic resupply costs to be even
higher than currently quoted basic launch vehicle costs.

LOGISTIC SYSTEM

SEMIBALLISTIC
CAPSULE

It has been shown that logistic costs to orbit are
relatively high when compared to transportation sys
tems of equal sophistication, such as commercial
transport. The next question is, why do logistic sys
tems cost so much to operate and which elements of
the system operation cost the most? Figure 4 shows
a relatively detailed cost breakout of the ALSS des
cribed above. The expendable portions of the cost
bars are indicated by shading. Shading also indicates
costs which are incurred because the recoverable sys
tem components are not basically designed for reuse.
It can be seen that approximately 66% of the total
operational cost is incurred because hardware com
ponents are expended and those that are recovered
are not readily reusable.
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Figure 2. Transportation Systems
not required to pay his share of development cost for
the logistic system). It should be noted here that the
return trip from orbit greatly increases the cost over
what is normally quoted for one-way delivery only.

In general, costs can be reduced appreciably by
reusable systems or by major reductions in expend
able costs. Both of these approaches will be explored
later.

Why are the aircraft costs so much less? The
following may be reasons:
1. The airliner is fully reusable.
2. The airliner is designed for economical and
rapid turnaround.
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ADVANCED LOGISTIC
SUPPORT SYSTEM

3. High airline utilization (traffic) spreads facility
costs and development costs.
4. Aircraft development costs are relatively lower
than those for spacecraft and expendable launch
vehicles.

SEMIBALLISTIC
CAPSULE
CARGO/
PROPULSION
MODULE

This discussion would lead to the general conclusion
that one promising method of reducing launch costs is
to develop a reusable launch system having airplane
charateristics. This was a general conclusion of the
AIAA Launch Vehicle Committee in March 1967
(Ref. 1 quote from a comment by G.H. Stoner, vice
president of Boeing, MI also can envision the eventual
system as a single-stage-to-orbit vehicle similar in
function and possibly appearance to the airplane of
today"). These vehicles are now within our grasp,
as will be discussed later.
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The foregoing discussion presents a dilemma re
garding reasons for the high cost of space transporta
tion. Next, letf s examine the elements which make
up the total cost (nonrecurring and recurring) of a
space transportation system. Figure 3 presents a
cost breakdown for the postulated NASA Advanced
Logistic Support System (ALSS), This logistic system
consists of a nine-man semiballistic crew module, a
cargo-maneuvering module and an uprated Saturn. IB
launch vehicle. The costs shown are based on devel
opment of the logistic spacecraft and operation of the
system for 133 flights to low earth orbit over a
nine-year operational period. The useful payload of
the system to a low earth orbit of 30 degrees inclina
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133 LAUNCHES
9 YR.

$8,988

Figure 3. Advanced Logistic Support System
(ALSS) Program
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Figure 4. ALSS Cost Breakdown
These high costs place space utilization in a very
special management and political category. The
reasons for a single space launch must be thoroughly
justified, well in advance, through many tiers of
management. Expendable hardware (launch vehicle)
must be programmed well in advance. The launch
vehicle must be completely loaded and possibly a
COST
group of relatively unrelated payloads must be
(BILLION $)
assembled. The economic and political consequences
of a failure (expenditure of launch vehicle and loss of
payload) to achieve mission objectives are tremendous.
This environment is not conducive to increased space
utilization.
Mission Potential

34% LOGISTIC
SYSTEM

29% LABORATORY
SYSTEM

14%MISSION
OPERATIONS
11% PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT
CREW TRAINING
FACILITIES

One key to lower launch costs is mission justifica
tion and increased traffic. Space missions fail into
three major categories: scientific, commercial, and
military. None of these areas alone can probably
justify a new launch system; but together they can.
From a scientific point of view, the earth orbital
space station seems a logical next step. The logistic
support system is a major element in a space station
program (Figure 5). Also, station flexibility is
severely hampered by the extreme premium placed on
reducing the number of logistic vehicle trips using
expendable launch systems.

MORL: MANNED ORBITING RESEARCH LAB.
5-YEAR OPERATION
4 LOGISTIC FLIGHTS/YR.
APOLLO SPACECRAFT
SATURN IB LAUNCH VEHICLE

Figure 5. Space Station System Cost
only possible to state in this unclassified paper that
all of these potential uses depend primarily on an
economical and flexible launch system.
There are currently missions being performed in
space (Figure 6) which could be performed more
economically using a low-cost launch system. The
current trend seems to be one of "leveling off," We
may be reaching a point in space activities where
current high costs are stifling traffic growth. The
new flexible, economic launch vehicle system must
come first; and the missions will follow.

While the space station itself may be considered a
scientific mission, the scientific/engineering task of
providing a low-cost space transporation system may
be a mission of equal or greater importance. There
is considerable historical precedent for NACA and
NASA providing basic aircraft research which was
used by the military and commercial interests to
create the air transportation system we have today.
Regarding commercial use of space, I think it is
sufficient to state that real commercial use of space
cannot take place until payioad delivery costs are well
below the current ~ $500 per pound.
A real justification for space utilization currently
lies in the military area. There are a myriad of
military orbital and suborbital uses of space. It is
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Figure 6. Space Traffic
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Potential Launch Systems

2. High development risk, stemming from an
inadequate technology base.

As was shown in the ALSS example above, launch
costs represented about 66% of the total logistic sup
port program costs. Two approaches are currently
being considered to reduce launch costs.

3. Lack of mission justification.
4. Apathy toward high expendable system launch
costs.
5. Heavy commitment to specific concurrent
expendable launch vehicles.

1. Low cost expendable systems.
2. Reusable systems.

6. Insufficient flexibility for mission or payload.

Low-cost expendable approaches make use of
"head-end steering, tr low-cost tank construction and
"simple" pressure-fed engine systems. "Head-end
steering" can be used as a generalized term to des
cribe a concept which places all of the expensive com
ponents such as guidance in a reusable spacecraft on
top of the low-cost booster. In some cases, the atti
tude control or steering during launch is provided by
rocket motors mounted on the reusable spacecraft and
the main boost engines are not required to gimbal.

7. Not really reusable, and thus having high re
furbishment cost.
In addition to all of these specific reasons, the timing
relative to national requirements has not been optimal.
Many of these problems have been overcome, and
current launch systems are extremely promising and
timely. Numerous studies have shown that reusable
spacecraft, particularly lifting types, provide opera
tional flexibility and economy as far as spacecraft
reuse is concerned. However, when a current ex
pendable launch vehicle is used to launch these space
craft, system costs become prohibitive. The stageand-one-half (1-1/2 stage) or drop tank concept shown
in Figure 7 was the first concept which really attacked
this problem. Here, a single reusable spacecraft,
incorporating rocket propulsion, is used to perform
both launch and spacecraft function. The drop tanks
used to supply propellants to the engines during the
initial launch are relatively simple and low cost. Of
course, the success of this concept depends to a large
degree on the ability to produce large, light-weight,
cryogenic drop tanks at low cost. Tank structure cost
estimates range between $50 and $100 per pound,
which means that the expendable tank costs for a
flight range between $2. 3 and $4. 7 million for a sys
tem providing a 14, 000-pound payload to a low earth
orbit.

Expendable launch vehicle costs arise from two
considerations. First, the cost of the equipment and
structure which is expended. Second, the cost of the
testing and checkout to assure that the first and only
flight the vehicle will make is successful. The lowcost expendable approach is not likely to be success
ful for three reasons:
1. Without a complete break with aerospace indus
try and government/customer practices, the
development and production of a low-cost ex
pendable launch vehicle is impossible. The
current state of the art in aircraft and launch
vehicles results in very sophisticated, highperformance, high-reliability hardware. It
would require a major revision to direct this
well established contractor/customer industry
to an "ammunition" approach.

In an effort to provide increased capability and re
duce system dependence on the drop tank costs, the
Triamese system was evolved. In this case, three
identical elements are used as shown in Figure 8.
One element (or stage) is designated the orbiter and
two are used as boosters. All rocket engines are
burning at vertical liftoff, and the orbiter engines are
using propellant being cross-fed from the boosters.
The boost elements are staged off when empty, and
the orbit element continues to orbit on its own inter
nal propellant. The boost elements perform an aero
dynamic lifting body recovery downrange, extend their
stowed wings and engines subsonically, and cruise
back to the launch site to make a normal aircraft
horizontal landing. When the orbiter has completed
its mission, it performs a lifting body entry and re
turns to the launch site in a manner similar to the
two boost elements. In this operation there are no
items expended, and the entire mission is performed
by a single vehicle design. In concept, the Triamese
is developed and performs like the ideal "single-stageto-orbit" system without the serious technology prob
lems. The fact that three identical vehicles are
attached in parallel during the initial boost has a
relatively minor influence on system operation or
economy.
*

2. The desire for successful operation on the first
and only flight may cause test and checkout
costs to overshadow the low launch vehicle
hardware cost.
3. A launch system having low-cost lower stages
still requires a sophisticated reusable upper
stage to carry the guidance system and provide
mission functions.
It is not the objective of this discussion to pursue
the low-cost expendable approach to any great degree,
especially in view of the interesting and promising
reusable systems which now exist.
The reusable launch vehicle approach is now about
10 years old. Myriads of vehicle concepts have been
investigated, ranging from fixed wings attached to
vertical takeoff rockets to the sophisticated air
collection Spaceplane.
These reusable launch systems have not moved
ahead for one or more of the following reasons.
1. High development cost.
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The Triamese system technology is a direct out
growth of the well established expendable launch ve
hicle. Figure 9 shows that the Triamese element
consists of an expendable launch vehicle structural
core around which are wrapped lightly loaded fairings
that thermally protect the structure and equipment
and provide a hypersonic lifting body shape.

LAUNCHWT.
PAYLOAD

The variable geometry, or stowable wing concept,
has been shown to provide efficient subsonic perform
ance while being lighter than competing approaches.
Stowable wings are used on the Triamese element to
serve several essential functions. The wings permit
efficient subsonic performance without the necessity
of a delta pianform on the basic body. The essentially
cylindrical elements are easy to stack in parallel for
launch. Subsonic cruiseback of the boost elements to
the launch site is efficiently performed.

899,680 LB.
14,000 LB.

The internal arrangement of a Triamese orbital
element is shown in Figure 10. The only major dif
ference between an orbital element and a boost ele
ment is that, in the boost element, the cylindrical
sections of the propellant tanks are extended into the
central cargo/equipment bay.

STAGE TANKS:
18,100 FPS

Figure 7. 1-1/2 Stage System
LAUNCH WT.
PAYLOAD

1,143,000 LB.
18,500 LB.

ORBITAL ELEMENT
TO ORBIT
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-8000 FPS
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BOOST ELEMENT
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tk2/
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Figure 8. Triamese System

EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE
Figure 9. Triamese Configuration Evolution
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TURBO-FAN
ENGINE

Figure 10.

118 FT.
LENGTH
LAUNCH WT. 358,000 LB.
18,500 LB.
PAYLOAD

ENTRY WT. 67,500 - 86,000 LB.
Triamese Orbital Element

offers
In addition to economy, the Triamese concept
11,
other operational flexibility. As shown in Figure
after the system is fully proven, it may be launched
jettison
at any azimuth since expended hardware is not
be no
ed, and the hazard to people and property should
greater than for overflight of aircraft.

Figure 11.

The Triamese system has good growth capability
payload
for a completely reusable system. Increased
body
can be provided by adding plugs in the constant
growth
section as shown in Figure 12. This type of
would be dependent upon normally expected rocket
also be
engine thrust growth. Triamese elements can
special
assembled in parallel in various numbers for
13.
missions and provide growth as shown in Figure

Triamese Unrestricted Launch
Azimuth Capability

CONSTANT-SECTION PLUGS

20-FT. STRETCH

by
The Triamese can be developed economically
flights
combining rocket and aircraft techniques. Initial
horizontal
would be made using the turbofan engines for
ent verti
takeoff with no propellant aboard. Single-elem
higher
cal takeoff flights would be made to gradually
velocities, reaching about 18, 000 feet per second.
to more
The element thus could be gradually exposed
severe heating and loads. Finally, launch economy
flights ap
permits testing a Triamese for a number of
nt
proaching its required life within a short developme
life.
subsystem
and
structural
verify
to
program
potential
reduction
cost
shows
system
A Triamese
when compared with the ALSS system discussed
n,
earlier, as shown in Figure 14. In this compariso
retained
expendable launch vehicle practices have been
to some extent for the Triamese system. Triamese
if full
system costs may be further reduced (~ 50%)
aircraft development techniques are used.
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Figure 12.
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Figure 13. Growth by Multiple Elements
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mese is definitely approaching state of the art. Third,
we almost admit that a new spacecraft concept is needed
(low g lifting entry, horizontal landing, on dry land, in
a reusable condition), and if we can combine the space
craft function with a reusable launch vehicle function
in a single reasonable cost program, we are interested.
The following paragraphs present seven of the major
reasons given in the past for delaying reusable launch
vehicle development. Each statement is accompanied
by current reasons why a system such as Triamese
should proceed.

I

/
/

1. Statement: Reusable launch vehicle develop
ment costs are high.
Status: Spacecraft users (NASA, Air Force)
have developed a strong desire to have a new
spacecraft with increased mission flexibility and
improved reusability. These users are talking
routinely about development programs approach
ing $1 billion spread over five or six years
(ALSS development cost is estimated to be $700
million over four years). A reusable launch
vehicle such as Triamese can be developed with
a similar budget and timing because technology
requirements are similar although physical sizes
are different.

'DEVELOPMENT
Figure 14 Systems Cost Comparison
Reusable Launch System Evaluation

The major reasons for not proceeding with a new
system have been mentioned above and are summar
ized in Figure 15 as the "anti-low-cost launch-system
feedback loop. " Only semitechnical reasons are
discussed here, and it must be remembered that many
important political factors also prevail (e.g., com
petition with concurrent expendable systems).

2. Statement: Reusable launch vehicle development
risk is high because an inadequate technology
base exists.

Expendable launch vehicles are currently available
in sufficient variety, development costs have been
paid, and operating costs are closely related to traffic.
Each expendable launch must be very highly justified
to warrant the large expenditure. Low traffic means
low program cost. In the ridiculous extreme, if no
expendable vehicles were flown, the cost would be
minimum providing also that no vehicles were built.
Figure 15 shows the current feedback loop from ex
pendable launch systems through low traffic right back
to expendable systems.

Status: Past reusable launch vehicle concepts
have been dependent on a wide range of technolo
gies. Many concepts required exotic airbreathing propulsion schemes and sustained hypersonic
flight in the atmosphere. The Triamese concept
is derived chiefly from a combination of current
expendable liquid propellant launch vehicle tech
nology with subsonic aircraft technology. light
weight thermal protection systems to provide
protection during entry is perhaps the most
critical technology remaining. However, the
ability to use uncoated superalloy heat shields
because of low entry planform loading is an
important relieving factor.

Exploring the other main leg in Figure 15, the re
usable launch system alternate has been pursued for
many years. Excessive development risk, development
cost, and operating cost have been used as the chief
reasons not to follow this approach. Turnaround cost
(i.e., refurbishment) has been cited as the reason for
high operating cost. Development and operating costs
must be evaluated relative to the anticipated traffic.
If traffic maintains its current level or increases, a
reusable launch system having sufficient mission flexi
bility becomes a logical choice. In summary, expend
able launch systems are associated with declining
space activity, and reusable launch systems should be
identified with a continuing or growing space program.

3. Statement: There are insufficient predicted
future missions to warrant the development
cost of a reusable launch vehicle.
Status: Figure 16 presents the classic cost-versus-traffic plots for an expendable and a reusable
system. Certain conservative assumptions have
been used in this figure. The expendable system
requires no further development and the Apollo
spacecraft and other investment costs are ignored.
The initial Triamese development and investment
costs are high ($2. 5 billion) by a factor of 2 if
true aircraft development procedures are used.
Triamese turnaround cost of $3 million per launch
is high for true aircraft-like operation. Even
with these conservative assumptions the Triamese
system begins to show savings after 60 launches.
Referring to Figure 6, it is seen that 60 launches
per year is approximately our current rate. We
currently have sufficient traffic potential to war-.

With the loop described above firmly established in
the technical/political community, what will permit a
promising concept such as Triamese to move forward
to realization? Three elements in the loop are chang
ing. First, we have reached the point where we have
strong desires to go on more missions than our budget
can afford in terms of expendable launch vehicles (the
National Space Station, MOL support, and advanced
military systems). Second, technology has slowly
progressed to the point where a concept such as Tria
6-23
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Figure 15. Anti-Low-Cost Launch-System Feedback Loop
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use. Jusification of new missions is too difficult
considering the sizeable cost of each additional
flight. The best way to reduce the cost of an ex
pendable launch vehicle is not to use it. An even
more economical approach is not to build any
more expendable vehicles. This logic quickly
results in the death of a space program. Our
immediate future approach may not be this de
cisive, but it certainly may retard the growth
of space utilization.

LAUNCH VEHICLE

4

TRIAMESE REUSABLE
LAUNCH VEHICLE

o
o
o
o
<
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6. Statement: Your reusable launch vehicle concept
does not have the mission and pay load flexibility
obtainable with an expendable launch vehicle and
a reusable spacecraft/service module concept.

O

200
100
TOTAL LAUNCHES

300

12345
YEARS (AT 60 PER YR. LAUNCH RATE)

Status: Some early reusable launch systems,
particularly airbreathing types, could not readily
handle varying size and volume payloads. As
discussed above and shown in Figure 13, the
parallel-staged, modular concept of the Triamese
permits growth to cover a wide range of payloads.
Also, although it is much larger, the Triamese
element has all the mission capability of a reus
able spacecraft plus added features such as suborbital and aero-cruise capability and large
available internal volume. However, it must be
admitted that a large orbiting element is not as
efficient as a smaller spacecraft with an expend
able propulsion module, if extensive propulsive
maneuvers in orbit are required. However, the
Triamese system acting as a tanker for a space
shuttle is attractive.

Figure 16. Program Cost Comparisons
rant the development of a reusable launch system.
If this development is not begun soon, new space
applications will not develop and traffic may
decrease to the point where development of a new
low-cost launch system is not warranted.
4. Statement: The expendable launch systems we
have are quite expensive to operate, but they
are adequate to support our current programs
requiring limited flights.
Status: The lunar program, based on a national
goal, is reaching a peak and may be tapering off
in activity. Both NASA with the National Space
Station, and the Air Force with MOL and its
possible successors, are in need of a logistic
support system. Government budgets are not
capable of handling the desired frequency of
logistic support using current expendable launch
vehicles. We cannot expand our space activities
based on the costs of current expendable launch

7. Statement: Reusable launch vehicles are not
really fully reusable without extensive and very
expensive refurbishing.
Status: Reusable launch vehicles can be designed
and developed to require minimum turnaround
servicing if an aircraft philosophy is adopted.
The only real difference between the turnaround
of a large jet aircraft and a reusable launch
vehicle is that the environment experienced by
each is slightly different. Complexity, safety
requirements, etc., are very similar. Thereusable launch vehicle can be designed for its

vehicles.
5. Statement: We are heavily committed in terms
of personnel, facilities, funds, etc., to our
current Saturn and Titan expendable launch
vehicles,
Status: It is becoming apparent that the current
expendable launch vehicles are too expensive to
0-24

more severe environment and then can be econ
omically tested on a number of flights approach
ing its anticipated service life (maybe 50 flights).
An aircraft does not have the luxury of a full life
test during its development.
It is important when discussing reusable launch
vehicles that the classic term "refurbishment" not be
used and the terms "servicing, maintenance, etc. , "
be substituted. The term refurbishment implies that
the vehicle is damaged to some extent and must be
disassembled and partially rebuilt. This is the wrong
philosophy for a reusable launch vehicle.
General Observations
1. It is becoming increasingly evident that full utiliza
tion of space cannot proceed until recurring payload delivery costs can be decreased from ~$500
to ~$20 per pound.
2. The expendable launch vehicle portion of a typical
space program represents ~ 66% of the total pro
gram cost. Therefore, the creation of an economi
cal reusable launch vehicle provides the potential
of significant program cost reduction.
3. Current and immediate future space traffic is suf
ficient to justify a new reusable launch system.
Space mission traffic may be currently reaching a
maximum unless economical launch is available
to encourage further mission expansion.
4. The Triamese reusable launch vehicle/spacecraft
concept is representative of a new breed of vehicles
which are available using mostly current technology.
The major attraction of the Triamese concept is
that it provides a completely reusable system with
the development of a single vehicle.
5. The "anti-low-cost launch-system feedback loop"
is still in operation. However, many of the ele
ments of the loop have weakened, and the possibility
of breaking the loop is close at hand. Potential
space traffic is a key element in the loop and unless
we move soon, the relatively modest space traffic
we now can predict may begin to decrease, and full
space utilization and the reusable launch system
may die together.
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